Tuition fees in higher education are currently capped in the UK so that almost all institutions and subjects are priced identically to the students. This unique price could be considered unfair and may lead to inefficient allocation if the returns to graduation differ with the quality of the instruction. This paper attempts to estimate differences in returns to degree in the UK. Using a wealth of estimators, including one of the first applications of Generalised Propensity Score, we estimate returns to teaching quality ranging from 1% to 6%. However, the returns are heterogenous and larger for the highest quality degrees. Moreover, the returns are under-estimated by measurement error in quality, especially when quality is measured at the degree level rather than the institution level.
I Introduction
European countries spend significantly less on higher education than the US (1.3% of GDP vs. 2.9% for the US, OECD 2007), and it is noted that most of the gap stems from the divergence in household and industry funding (EU, 2005) . Thus, the debate about the role of tuition fees in the financing of higher education is thriving with recommendations on increasing the share that students pay towards their education mounting. Indeed the number of European countries charging tuition fees increased from 15 to 18 out of 29 between 2004 (CESifo, 2008 . However, the level of fees charged remains low by international standards even in the UK which is the European country with the highest fees for undergraduate studies (£3,145) . In most European countries charging tuition fees, those are fixed or capped by the regulator rather than decided by the market. Graduates are thus fully capturing the rent accruing to quality without contributing to the additional costs. As the UK government is reviewing the evidence regarding the tuition fees cap and institutions are lobbying for greater freedom to decide on tuition fees, it is timely to investigate the claim that financial returns substantially vary with quality. We then compute the fees that universities could charge if they, rather than their graduates, could capture the quality rent fully. As well as being of interest to higher education stake holders, the paper also explores the robustness of the results to a wealth of estimation strategies including Generalised Propensity Score (Hirano and Imbens, 2004 ) since institution quality can be seen as a continuous treatment 1 and measurement error.
The debate on the effect of institutions on earnings has received a large amount of attention in the US where the market for higher education is fiercely competitive, but much less around the world. There are a few empirical evidences for the UK but their results are ambiguous and they mostly predate the introduction of tuition fees. Instead, we use a dataset pertaining to the 2003 cohort of graduates, who were charged a £1,200 annual "top-up" fee, conditional on parental income, which can be linked to administrative data so that background information on the students and academic performance can be added. The survey includes graduates from all the UK institutions rather than sub-samples of less than 40 institutions that have been mostly used previously, thus we have more variation in the quality measure.
The difficulties in this literature are first to measure quality as there is no agreement on which input matters. Black and Smith (2006) offers an extensive treatment of the bias that may results from measuring quality with error and offers four different econometric methods to reduce this bias. We innovate by measuring quality specifically for the degree rather than at the institution level as has been done in the rest of the literature. We have thus a more pertinent measure of quality as well as additional variation in quality. We also investigates the sensitivity of our results to alternative measure of teaching quality and measurement error. Second, students from different academic ability sort themselves into institutions of various quality (Hoxby, 1997) , thus naïve estimates assuming random allocation of students to institutions could be severely biased. Black and Smith (2004) demonstrate that while selection on observable is plausible, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) may still lead to biased results if there is a lack of common support, i.e. no high ability student are observed in low quality institutions, so that the parameter is identified from the functional form.
Moreover, OLS assumes linearity of the quality effect which may also be problematic. Highlighting the problems of lack of common support Black and Smith (2004) for the US and Chevalier and Conlon (2003) for the UK, use propensity score matching to non-parametrically estimate the effect of institution quality. As well as propensity score matching, we also implement Hirano and Imbens (2004) Generalised Propensity Score (GPS) which expand propensity score matching techniques to continuous treatments. As in the case of binary treatment GPS assumes that the selection into degrees of different quality (the treatment) is based on observable characteristics. If this assumption is valid GPS provides unbiased estimates of the effect of quality on earnings in the general case where quality is not constrained to be a dichotomous variable. We believe that the UK provides an interesting case where the assumption of selection on observable is likely to be satisfied as the allocation of students to institutions is based on a centralised system where all applications are judged from the same standard form 2 . In the administrative data at our disposal we have almost the same information that is available to institutions when they make an offer to a student.
With all estimates we find positive returns to quality up to 6%, but we highlight their heterogeneity as these returns are economically significant only for graduates from the top-quartile institutions. We provide various robustness checks and use IV to assess measurement error bias, which is quite large when quality is measured at the degree level. We also investigate the impact of non-observable characteristics on estimates of teaching quality. Finally we calculate the tuition fee differentials which would make students indifferent over their life-time between
institutions of different quality.
The rest of the paper is organised as follow. Section 2 reviews the US and non-US literature on the financial returns to higher education quality. In Section 3 we discuss the institutional background as well as the data. Section 4 presents the estimators used in the analysis. The results are available in Section 5 and a discussion on robustness check, measurement error and the role of unobserved characteristics, implied tuition fees are found in Section 6.
II Literature review
The literature on the effect of higher education quality on earnings mainly originates from the US 3 . One of the first studies to account for selection of students between institutions of different quality is Brewer et al. (1999) . They conclude that even correcting for selection into the type of university attended (identified by net tuition costs), prestigious private institutions provide significantly higher financial returns compared to low cost public institutions. However, there are little returns to attending an elite public institution. Black and Smith (2004) confirm that fee differentials are in line with quality differentials, but criticise the parametric approach adopted in the rest of the literature, especially the linearity assumption. Using propensity score matching instead, they highlight that, as predicted by Hoxby (1997) , sorting of students to institutions is not random. Their main results pertain to the wage differential between graduates from institutions in the top and bottom quartile of the quality distribution (+12% for men, +7% for women). This large quality gap makes the assumption of selection on observable potentially problematic, and may not represent the typical choice of students who are more likely to arbitrate between institutions of more similar quality. When estimating the wage differential between students from the second and third quality quartile compared to the lowest one, the estimated quality effect was small and statistically insignificant for men and around 3 Bowman and Mehay (2002) estimate the effect of college quality on performance rather than earnings. They find positive effect of attending private and higher-rated institutions on appraisal and promotion, consistent with the earnings effects estimated elsewhere. Robst (1995) also reports that graduates from higher ranked institutions are less likely to experience over-education.
12% for women. The large range may be due to the small sample size which leads to imprecise estimates.
However, students' unobservable characteristics may still bias these estimates upwards; for example, if more motivated students attend more prestigious institutions and also, independently of the institution quality, earn higher wages. Berg-Dale and Krueger (2002) , using information on all applications, control for selectivity on unobservables and find no financial return to attending a more selective institution, maybe due to the homogeneity of institution quality in the dataset used (30 institutions only). Long (2008) uses the National Education Longitudinal Study to assess whether the differences in results are due to the use of different estimators, and compares four estimates (OLS, IV, matching and selection on unobservable estimators) within a common framework. He mostly confirms the conclusions from Black and Smith (2004) and Berg-Dale and Krueger (2002) . Contradicting these evidences that accounting for unobservables eliminate the quality premium, Behrman et al. (1996) find significant wage differentials between female twins who attended colleges that differ along various measures of quality 4 . Black and Smith (2006) also highlight that the estimate of quality is likely to be biased downwards by measurement error. Most studies have estimated quality by relying on the average SAT scores of attending students, but since quality is likely to be multi-dimensional this is only a proxy for the institutional quality. Instead, Black and Smith (2006) recommend using an array of quality measures and/or estimation techniques that account for measurement error (IV, GMM, Bounds) 5 .
4 Lindahl and Regnér (2005) use a between-sibling estimates to reduce the bias due to unobserved characteristics and estimate that in Sweden OLS estimates are twice as large as the within family estimates, suggesting a large bias in regressions not correcting for selectivity. 5 An alternative identification, although in a non-US set-up is provided by Kawaguchi and Ma (2008) who use the closure of registration at the top Japanese institution in 1969 as a natural experiment. They
It is unclear how much can be extrapolated from US evidence since in other countries the market for higher education tend to be more regulated with less freedom to fix tuition fees. Amongst British evidence, Naylor et al. (2000) use administrative data on the population of individuals graduating from old universities in 1994.
Among this selective group of universities no significant institution effect is found.
This study suffers from important caveats: first, the selected institutions are more homogenous than the universe of higher education institutions in the UK; second graduates earnings are imputed from occupational status six months after graduation.
Other works has relied on surveys from various graduate cohorts. Belfield and Fielding (2001) reveals that an increase of one standard deviation in quality is associated with a wage premium ranging from 2.5% to 5.5%, increasing for the more recent cohorts.
However, these UK studies did not account for the selection of students to institutions. Chevalier and Conlon (2003) use propensity score matching to estimate the effect of university quality on the earnings of three cohorts of graduates (1985, 1990 and 1995) . Their measures of quality are an indicator of appurtenance to a selfselected pressure group of prestigious universities (Russell Group) and an indicator estimate that this cohort, that was denied access to the most prestigious institution, is less likely to have been promoted to top position thus providing evidence that institution quality matters.
for when the institution was granted university status 6 . Graduating from the most prestigious institution is associated with a wage premium ranging from 1% to 6% but there is no significant difference between the earnings of graduates at old and new institutions. There is also some evidence that the premium for attending the higher quality institutions increases for more recent cohorts suggesting that as the number of graduates expanded employers may have used institution prestige to differentiate between candidates. Chevalier and Conlon (2003) also estimate the effect of institution quality on wage growth and reports that the effect of institution quality on earnings is stable (for the first 10 years after graduation).
The literature has estimated reduced forms of the institution quality effect which could encapsulate various theories. First, the estimated effects could reflect that the higher quality institutions generate some additional human capital amongst their graduates. Second, higher quality institutions may provide some signals to employers which use it when recruiting individuals from which they have little knowledge of their intrinsic productivity. Third, the returns may be capturing some kind of network effect, were young graduates get appointed to high earning positions thanks to the presence of alumni from their "Alma Mater" in the firm. In the second and third case, the institution quality is not associated with any gains for the economy, apart maybe from sorting, and only the individual gains. The data available to us do not offer opportunities to test these hypotheses convincingly either.
III Institutional background and data description
The Table A1 for details on the sample selection).
We supplement the dataset with measures of institution quality. There is no unambiguous measure of institution quality in the UK. We use the quality score by subject as published yearly in the Guardian Newspaper, as this information is widely available and relevant to applying students. This quality score is a weighted average of scores along six dimensions which reflect the quality of the teaching in each subject/institution pair; they include, teaching inspection, spending per students, staff/student ratio, job prospects, value added and entry score 7 . The total score is on a scale from 0 to 100. At the subject level, the individual components are not available, 7 The teaching score is based on the Quality of Teaching Assessment. The following three statistics are provided by the universities via the Higher Education Statistical Agency. The graduate prospects relates to the proportion of students who are in graduate-level employment or full-time studies six months after graduation. This information is collected from the Destination of Higher Education Leavers, a survey of the full cohort of higher education leavers. Entry score refers to average tariff points of first-year students in the subject while value added is an attempt to relate the probability of obtaining a first class degree conditional on entry score.
so we cannot take a subset of these variables to compute an alternative quality score. Figure 1 demonstrates the importance of measuring quality at the subject rather than institution level. It reports for each institution the measure of quality in each subject taught as well as the institution quality -measured as the weighted average for each subject, with the weight being the number of full time equivalent students.
For most institutions, there is a large amount of variability in the quality of the subject taught and the correlation between subject and institution quality is only 0.66. The quality measure is thus more variables than in the rest of the literature which should allow us to estimate the quality effect more precisely. This also suggests that the previous literature which has relied on a measure of quality at the institution level was plagued by measurement error which would have under-estimated the effect of quality on earnings. relationship between the quality of teaching and the earnings of graduates. It also highlights that the relationship may be convex rather than linear and thus casts doubts on the linearity assumption sometime imposed in other analysis. The differences in wages by quality are substantial; moving from the bottom 10% of quality to the top 10% increases wages by almost 50%.
The second relationship that we need to investigate is the amount of sorting between the academic ability of students and the quality of teaching. As stated previously, if the sorting is perfect then it would not be possible to identify the effect of institution quality. However, the allocation mechanism in the UK provides hopes that some heterogeneity in the composition of the student body will be found. The admission process is centralised: high school pupils fill in a standard form where they state the six pairs (institution, subject) where they would like to study 8 . Our dataset is linked to administrative data so that we observe the same information as universities do when deciding whether or not to make an offer 9 . Since students have imperfect information on their ability or Furnham, 2001 , for a review), the restriction on the number of applications means that one strategy to guarantee access to higher education is for students to apply to a range of institutions, hence generating imperfect sorting between students' ability and institution's quality. Based on the predicted, and not the observed end of the year high stake exams (A-levels), and previous qualifications, institutions make offers to students conditional on them reaching a pre-determined score at the high stake exams. Students can accept only one offer and keep another one as an insurance choice in case they do not reach the 8 Students applying to medical, dentistry and veterinary schools can only state four choices. As well as candidates to Cambridge and Oxford universities they also need to apply earlier than other students, typically in the October of the year preceding their entry to higher education, as part of the selection process includes interviews. 9 The compulsory fields on the UCAS form are name, gender, age, address, country of birth, nationality, financing, disability, ethnicity, occupational background of parental figure if under 21 and previous school attended, which we also obtain when linking the survey to administrative data. The UCAS form also includes previous qualification, references -typically for the pupils' teacher -the student personal statement and their predicted exam results if still currently in high school. This information is not available in our dataset. Instead we have the realised score at the high stake exam (A-levels).
pre-required score of their preferred conditional offers. When the A-levels results are revealed matches are confirmed or terminated. Pupils who fail to achieve the requirements of their first choice are committed to their insurance choice. For those who fail the requirement of their insurance choice, a clearing mechanism allocates candidates to institutions that still have places on their courses. These clearing places are allocated on a first come first serve basis -as long as academic credentials are appropriate. Typically higher quality subjects do not rely on clearing to recruit students as they are over-demanded. Thus, a candidate who was accepted in a high quality institution but marginally failed to achieve the required score may at this stage only be able to register in a lower quality institution. On the other hand, candidates who over-performed are locked in their accepted offer. Since, there is little mobility between institutions during the under-graduate studies, this mechanism of allocation makes it credible that while selection is based on academic merit, it is imperfect and a common support may be found.
As expected the average attainment differs widely between students in subjects of different quality. In the top teaching quartile the average A-levels score of graduates is 21.1 out of 30, almost 5 points more than in the third quartile and almost twice as much as10.4 points more than in the bottom quarter subjects (Table 1 ). Figure 3 plots the distribution of A-level score by quality quartile. Clearly the allocation of students to institution is not random. Students attending departments in the bottom half of the teaching quality, originate from a distribution that looks close to a normal with a large spread. Department at this quality of teaching teach students with very low A-level but also some top quality students. The distribution of A-level is further shifted to the right in third quartile institution but does not look too dissimilar. In the top teaching department, 70% of the intake of students has an above average A-level and the distribution is much more compressed. The sorting of students to department is thus asymmetrical with high quality students mostly but not uniquely found in high quality department and weak students almost only found in weaker departments; this sorting is consistent with the recruitment procedure. Candidates who under-performed are not offered a place in a high quality departments while some candidates with high grades either by choice or because they performed better than expected are in low quality departments. While common support is universal, the support may be rather thin.
These conclusions of asymmetric sorting and thin common support are similar to Black and Smith (2004) for the US.
Students at departments of different quality also vary along other dimensions. Table 1 reports the means for all variables reported by the pupils on their application.
Students at the highest quality departments have in general more favourable characteristics.
For example they are four times less likely not to have any A-levels, three times more likely to have parents in manager or professional occupations, and 10 times more likely to have been educated at an independent school than students at the lowest quality quartile institutions. Living with parents while studying reduces the choice of institutions that a student can apply to and can thus be used as a proxy for financial constraint; students at the top institutions are 3 times less likely to be living with their parents. The differences in students characteristics between institutions are thus consequent. Table 1 also reports post-graduation characteristics. Graduates from higher quality institutions are 50% more likely to have obtained an additional qualification than those at the bottom one. As highlighted in Table 1, institution quality is associated with wage differential and students from the top quartile institutions earn 25% than their peers at the lower end of the quality distribution. The wage gap appears especially large between 3 rd and 4 th quality quartiles. Moving from quartile 1 to 2 and to 3 is associated with an average wage increase of £1,000 but moving from 3 to 4 the gap is more than three times as large. Quality effects may thus be heterogenous. On other labour market outcomes, the differences between graduates from the best and worst institutions are more modest.
IV Empirical model
The first, maybe naïve strategy is to estimate the effect of institution quality on log earnings (ln Y) by Ordinary Least Squares. Typically, the estimated model would be of the form:
where Q is a measure of university quality, X 1 a set of individual characteristics on graduation and X 2 a set of current characteristics. X 2 can be considered endogenous as the university quality may affect various dimensions of the labour market attainment of graduates. The parameter of interest is 1 β which represents the increase in earnings due to an increase in quality. However, as stated previously 1 β may be biased, even if (1) includes all confounding factors correlated with both quality and earnings if the relationship between quality and earnings is non-linear and if there is a lack of common support (in which case the identification is purely due to the imposed functional form). The first limitation can be eliminated by measuring quality in a nonlinear form: a set of dummies, or a polynomial function.
(1) can also be estimated by quantile regression in order to test for heterogeneity in the effect of quality on earnings which have been highlighted in the descriptive statistics. So that for each quantile p we can, following Koenker and Basset (1978) , define the conditional quantile of the distribution as: 
ATT can be estimated if
, which is never observed, can be approximated. If the allocation of students to universities is not random, then
. However, if it can be argued that the selection is based on observable characteristics (X) then the earnings of non-treated individuals can be used as counterfactual to approximate the unobserved earning of treated individuals if they had not been treated, i.e. conditional on this set of variables X an observation can be considered randomly allocated to either the treatment (high quality institution) or the control group ( ( ) ( )
. Since we observe almost the same information as universities when they make an offer to a student the assumption of selection on observable is plausible. The only difference in the set of observables is that universities make their offer using the results of past exams and the predicted grades at A-levels while we observe the realised A-levels grades.
Both OLS and matching produce unbiased estimates as long as the selection into institution of high quality is due to observed variables, but matching also highlights potential bias due to lack of common support, i.e. treated observations with a given X cannot be matched to any control observation. Formally, the common support can be expressed as:
; not all individuals with the characteristics X get treated. This probability is the propensity score which is used to match observations, rather than X, so as to reduce the dimentionality of the matching problem. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that it is equivalent to match on all the components of X or on Pr(D=1/X).
For each treated individual i, the counterfactual outcome associated with no treatment is a weighted average of the outcomes from control observations, where the weights are a function of the distance between the treated and control observations' propensity scores (using Epanechnikov kernel). If no match is found within a bandwidth, the treated observation cannot be matched which highlights the lack of common support discussed above.
In the case of interest here, considering a binary treatment may be problematic. Black and Smith (2004) for example mainly estimate the effect of moving form the bottom quartile of the quality distribution to the first quartile. Only a fraction of students will consider switching from a bottom quartile to a top quality quartile institution, so the estimate may be of limited interest. Moreover, by considering institutions that are so different, the common support always become extremely thin. Instead, we estimate three effects: moving from the first to the second quality quartile, second to third and third to fourth.
Moreover, we also consider that quality is a (almost) continuous variable and is rather similar to the dichotomous case. A Generalised Propensity Score (GPS) is calculated which is the density of the treatment (T) conditional on a set of covariates X: R=r(T,X), the GPS has similar properties to the propensity score in the dichotomous case, mainly it satisfies CIA, so that:
A two-step procedure is then used to remove any bias due to differences in X. bootstrapping to obtain standard errors of the estimates. Rather than the dose response function, we report its derivative: in our case the interpretation is the marginal return to university quality.
As in the case of dichotomous treatment, the GPS is only valid if the matching leads to a balancing of the characteristics of the treated and untreated group. To assess the balancing, we divide the institution quality variable into three terciles and test for each variable whether the GPS adjusted mean differs in one tercile compare to the other two. This is equivalent to testing that the conditional mean and the treatment indicator are independent (CIA) where r(t,X) is evaluated at the median value of the treatment within the tercile (t*). We follow Hirano and Imbens (2004) and test this hypothesis by blocking. For each tercile, we define five blocks defined by the quintile of r(t*,X). For each block we calculate the mean difference in X for observations (T = t) and (T t ≠ ), and combine these five mean differences, weighted by the number of observations in each block, to calculate a t-statistics of the statistical differences in the mean of X between treated and untreated observations in that tercile.
V Results
As discussed above, the main criteria used by universities to accept candidates are their predicted score at a high stake exam but we use the realised score instead to control for students' ability 10 . The decision to apply to departments of different quality may also be related to other observable characteristics which are also available on the UCAS form. Thus, in the empirical analysis we additionally controls for individual characteristics (sex, age, ethnicity, disability status) and other background 10 Gibbons and Chevalier (2007) find small differences between teacher assessments and realised scores at age 16 especially for pupils at the extremes of the ability distribution but these differences have no impact on subsequent pupil outcomes. Hayward et al. (2005) report "reasonable accuracy" (+/-one grade) at A-levels and no impact of the error on higher education participation.
characteristics like school type, parental occupational class, whether expect to live at home when studying and tuition fee status, which would approximate financial constraints. All these variables are available to universities when assessing a student's application.
V-A Discrete measure of quality First, to facilitate comparisons with previous research, the continuous quality measure is recoded into quartiles with the fourth quartile representing the highest quality. Table 2 reports estimates of (1) estimated by OLS for different specifications of the covariates. The sample is restricted to graduates with a valid measure of quality, working full-time and earning less than £60,000 per annum. In the first column, the only additional control is a set of postcode dummies to capture the characteristics of the local labour market. There are some marked quality effects and graduates from the top departments earn 13% more than those from lowest quality departments. The estimates for the second and third quartile are almost similar at 3.7% and 3.9% respectively and at the border of statistical significance. However, these estimates will be biased upwards since the quality of intake students is correlated both with institutional quality and earnings. Thus the second column adds a cubic function of A-levels score to control for ability. The estimates on the effect of quality are dramatically reduced and only the estimate from the top quartile remains statistically significant at 5.8%. These findings confirm that there is a large amount of sorting of students by ability and that the effect of quality is non-linear. The next two columns report models that controls for various dimensions of the individual characteristics and socio-economic background; this reduces the quality effect further, so that none of the premia remain statistically significant. The point estimates are in line with Hussain et al. (2009) who also estimates that returns are mostly observed in the top quartile and range from 3% to 16% depending on which variable is used to measure quality. In the last column, we add controls for subject of studies and degree grades. These variables are potentially endogenous as they may be correlated both with quality and earnings. Including them reduces the quality premium further.
We also replicate estimates from Black and Smith (2004) and Chevalier and Conlon (2003) and estimate the institution quality effects by propensity score matching. The estimates are the average treatment effect for attending a department of quality in the quartile q rather than in the quartile q-1, and are thus not directly comparable to the OLS estimates where the base category was always the bottom quality departments. Using subsequent quartile is more similar to students' alternatives when selecting departments and thus increases the probability of matching individuals. Propensity scores are estimated separately for each treatment.
We use two specifications of the propensity score which include the same set of variables as the OLS models presented in the column 4 and 5 of Table 2 . Both specifications of the propensity score lead to balanced treated and control samples. In all cases the common support is rather large and at least 95% of the treated are matched to some control observations. Figure 4 reports the distributions of propensity score separately for treated and non-treated observation when the treatment is attending a 4th quartile university rather than a third quartile university. Similar pictures are obtained for other treatments.
The PSM estimates are reported in Table 3 . The largest effect of university quality on earnings is found for moving from the third to the fourth quartile, consistent with our OLS results. This effect ranges from 6.1% to 7.1% depending on the propensity score used, the two estimates not being significant different from each others. Moving from a second to a third quality quartile institution is never associated with a significant effect while moving from the bottom to the second quality quartile is associated with earnings 4% higher in the more parsimonious specification. The propensity score is reasonably thick with between 150 and 270 control observations responsible for 50% of the matches.
The OLS estimates presented in Table 2 are cumulative and estimate the earning gap compared to the lowest quality quartile. The OLS and matching estimates lead to the same conclusion that the financial returns to quality are the highest for the top teaching quartile, nil at intermediary level and low at the bottom quartile. The effect of quality on earnings is thus clearly non-linear. However, OLS estimates substantially dampen this non-linearity.
V-B Continuous measure of quality
Since we have a continuous measure of quality available the second panel of Table 2 reports the estimates of the quality wage gap using this score. Different specifications using quadratic and cubic terms in quality were also estimated but, surprisingly considering our previous results, the higher orders of the polynomials were never significant. Later we investigate the non-linearity of this relationship without imposing a functional form. In the most parsimonious model, increasing teaching quality by one standard deviation increases earnings by 5.5%. As in the discrete case, adding covariates, especially the ability proxy, considerably reduces this premium which in the most complete model reaches 1.8%, which is lower than the 5.30% obtained by Hussain et al. (2009) with a similar specification but using the 1999 cohort of graduates 11 .
OLS estimates would be unbiased if selection was based on observable characteristics and if the relationship between quality and log earnings was linear. We now release this last constraint and use the GPS method proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2004) to estimate the institution quality effect on the earnings of recent graduates. As in the case of dichotomous treatment, the balancing properties of the estimated GPS need to be assessed. First, we split the sample into three terciles with respect to the quality of the institution attended. In the first part of Table A2 , we report t-test of the mean difference for the treated and non-treated observations.
Clearly, there are marked differences between graduates from institutions at different level of the quality distribution. However, after conditioning on GPS, all mean differences are dramatically reduced and become insignificant. Appendix 2 also reports the distribution of propensity score, estimated at the median value of each tercile for the three treatment groups defined. In all cases there is a case of common support.
We use two specifications of the General Propensity Score. The first one includes all the covariates pertaining to the social background of the student -as in specification (4) of the OLS estimates, while the second also adds controls for subject choice and grade. Figure 5 reports the marginal effects of institution quality on earnings throughout the distribution of treatment for both specifications of the GPS 12 .
In both cases, the quality effect is convex, positive. In the more parsimonious specification, the institution quality effect is significant for graduating from an institution with a normalised quality score below -1.7 and above 1.2. Thereafter the all level of income, quantile regressions allows it to differ for different quantiles of the income distribution. One may for example, expect that individuals with higher earning potential may gain more from attending a higher quality institution. While generally increasing with quantile, the estimates are never significantly different from the OLS estimates. 12 We trim the tails of the quality distribution due to very low frequencies which were preventing the calculations of standard errors in the bootstrap procedure.
marginal effect on earnings of teaching quality increases sharply and reaches a maximum of 7.5% for the top quality. The more extensive specification leads to a flatter distribution of estimates, reaching a maximum of 4.5% but with the positive effect of teaching on earnings starting at a lower quality level. The general conclusions are identical between the two specifications; there are some quality effects at both end of the distribution. At the very low end of the quality distribution those affect a very small proportion of graduates (less than 2% of our observations).
At the higher end, the teaching quality effects become significant around the threshold between 3 rd and 4 th quartiles and range from 4.5% to 7.5% at the top end. These conclusions that teaching quality matters only in the tails of the distribution are similar to the one obtained when using discrete measures of quality.
Using a wide array of estimators, we consistently find that teaching quality is associated with positive financial returns for graduates. In Table 4 , we provide evidence that these results are robust. First, we investigate the issue of individuals with an A-level score of 0, since this group contains individuals with no A-level but also individuals without record of their A-levels and some with foreign qualifications.
The lack of precise information on the academic quality of this group may thus bias our estimates. The excluded group has significantly lower wages (0.03 log point) and
graduate from lower quality department (-0.31 point). The exclusion of this group reduces the estimates by about 25%
Second, we eliminate institutions and subjects for which the selection process includes an interview as this makes the assumption of selection on observable characteristics less plausible. This selection eliminates mostly graduates from high quality departments (the average quality of the excluded group is 1.4 point greater)
with higher earnings; the unconditional wage differential is 0.50 log points greater for the excluded group. Excluding these individuals substantially alter our results when using a discrete measure of quality; none of the OLS estimates are significantly different from zero and when using propensity score matching only moving from a first to a second quartile quality department has significant effect on earnings. At the top of the distribution, the point estimate is reduced to 2.2. However, when the CTS estimate is comparable to the one obtained for the full sample. Clearly, eliminating a large section of individuals from high teaching quality department reduces the return to quality.
Third, we assess whether there are any gender differences in returns to quality.
There is no difference in the average teaching quality by gender but men are paid on average 6% more than women. With the exception of the top quartile, there is no return to quality for men. For women the U-shape pattern found for the full sample is observed.
The last robustness check assesses the effect of a change in the measure of quality. Rather than measure the quality in the subject of graduation, we use an aggregate measure of the teaching quality at the institution level. This is more in line with the rest of the literature. We initially assumed that institution quality was a noisy measure of the teaching quality of a specific degree and thus estimates using quality at the institution level would be biased towards zero. However, the estimates relying on institution quality are generally larger than those relying on subject-specific teaching quality. Thus our estimates appear relatively robust.
To follow on this issue of measurement error in the measure of quality used, we also rely on instrumental variables to assess the extent of the possible bias due to measurement error. Since, the measure of quality used is multi-dimensional the bias due to measurement error is likely to be reduced compare to studies relying on a single proxy for quality. -see Black and Smith (2006) for an extensive discussion on the attenuation bias. As instruments we rely on a measure of research quality which was not included in the composition of the teaching quality score, however, it can be argued that research activity is another dimension of teaching quality, if for example more research active department teach more up-to-date developments compare to less active departments, or are able to cross-subsidise teaching with some of the research income. Table 5 presents the results of the IV estimates. When teaching quality is measured at the subject level, the instrument is the 2001 research assessment score for this subject 13 . We also instrument the institution wide quality by the institution average RAE score (IV1) or an alternative measure of quality based on data from the "Times" newspaper which include RAE, academic expenditure, students/staff ratio and entry grade (IV2). In the last column, we use both set of instruments (IV3) and reject the over-identification test, that the results are significantly different when using one instrument or the other. The IV estimators is twice as large as the OLS when quality is measured at the subject level, and up to 20% larger when quality is measured at the institution level, reaching between 5.1% and 6.5% when instrumented which is similar to the range found by Hussain et al. (2009) . The difference between the OLS and IV results is smaller when quality is measured at the institution level which could suggest that this measure suffers from less measurement error (Black and Smith, 2006) .
VI Discussion
13 Subject of degree and unit of assessments at the RAE have been matched as closely as possible. For observations for which no subject specific RAE score is available we use the institution average RAE score.
We can now estimates the maximum that graduates would be ready to pay in order to graduate from a higher teaching quality department, i.e. the point at which they would be indifferent between graduating at a cheaper lower teaching quality and a higher quality department that would provide greater income over their life-time.
Implicitly, we thus assume that the university would be able to capture the full rent originating from the teaching quality.
Graduates from a 3 rd quartile quality department earn on average £22,411 per annum three years after graduation. We can use our range of estimates to calculate the life time premium that would be associated with these students graduating from a 4 th quartile quality instead. On average the difference in quality score between these institutions is about one standard deviation. The estimated effects of quality for a change in 1 standard deviation are between 2% (OLS, CTM) and 6% (IV). Assuming a growth rate of 2% over the life time, a 40-years long participation to the labour force and a discount rate of 3.5%, the difference in the net present value of the life time earnings at 18 between a would-be graduate at a third quartile department and one at a fourth quartile department ranges from £3,900 to £23,300 assuming constant returns over the life-time. Since it takes three years to graduate, this student would be indifferent in paying at most an additional £1,300 to £8,300 in tuition fees to attend the higher quality institution.
It is possible to argue that returns to quality increase over time, if for example, greater teaching quality increases the chances and speed of promotion. Alternatively, if teaching quality is used as an approximation of ability by employers then its value may diminish as true ability is revealed. For the 1985 cohort, Chevalier and Conlon (2003) provide some evidence that the institution wage gap remains constant over the first 10 years after graduation. We now recalculate the present value of teaching quality relaxing the assumption that they are constant over the life time. First, we assume that the returns to quality increase over the life time: 1% (5%) for the first 10 years, 3% (10%) for the following 10 years and 7% (15%) thereafter. All the other assumptions made to calculate the present value of this income flow and the expected fee differentials remain the same as above. In these two scenarios, the expected fee differential would be between £5,700 and £14,900 respectively. Finally, assuming that the returns decrease from 6% (2%) to 3% (1%) and then 1% (0%) over the same schedule, the fee maximum fee differential would then be £4,200 (£1,200) . To summarise, the maximum fee differential that the best institutions would be able to charge ranges from £1,200 to £14,900.
To check the plausibility of these numbers, we first compare them to the range of reported academic expenditures per student. Expenditures on students are affected by the subject of study with science graduates being more expensive to teach.
Focusing on institutions with about 40% of students studying science, the UK average in 2002/03, Oxford and Cambridge universities were spending on average £9,000 on academic expenditures per student (HESA, 2003, own calculations) . This compares with expenditures around £4,500 for a quartile three institution with a similar science mix and £2,000 in the least spending institutions 14 . Academic expenditures are probably an underestimate of the total costs of providing education, so the estimated tuition fee differentials appear plausible. They can also be compared to tuition fees differentials in the US. Tuition fees at top private institutions average $25,000, $10,000 more than at less prestigious private colleges. A similar $10,000 gap is found between the high-cost and low-cost public institutions, which is consistent with a wage premium around 3%.
14 The average academic expenditures per undergraduate student in doctoral universities in the US were $9,400 at public institutions and $16,300 at private institutions in (Trends in College Pricing, 2007 Finally, we assess the validity of the assumption that returns to teaching quality are constant over time indirectly by using the National Child Development Study (NCDS). The NCDS is a longitudinal survey which follows individuals born in 1958 through out their life. We do not have a measure of university quality for this dataset but we can rely on teaching quality during compulsory education, to assess how the returns to teaching quality vary over time. As a proxy for teaching quality, we rely on the type of school attended when age 16; these range from independent (private) school, grammar school (academically selective), comprehensive (no selection) and secondary modern (lower tracking choice). We control for ability in maths and reading at age 11 but these returns may still be biased if unobservable characteristics are correlated both with school choice and future earnings. Earnings are observed at age 23, 33 and 42. In Table 6 , we assess whether the returns to teaching quality vary over time in the NCDS.
Additionally, we have assumed through out that selection into teaching quality is based on observable characteristics mostly due to the allocation system. However, unobservable characteristics may affect the set of institutions applied to which could invalidate the assumption of selection on observables. One such characteristic may be academic motivation. The NCDS allows us to test the extent that omitting academic motivation bias the estimates on returns to teaching quality.
After controlling for ability, highest qualification, parental social class, as well as gender, labour market experience and part-time work, only attending an independent school has a significant return, at the 10% level. This returns increases by 30% between age 33 and 42, for individuals who are employed at these two points in time. For the other type of schools, return also increase with age but remain not significant. Academic motivation has a positive return, between 2% and 3% for an increase in motivation by one standard deviation, however, including it does not reduce the estimates on teaching quality, despite motivation being positively correlated with school quality. Assuming that these results from the NCDS are transposable to our cohort of graduates, they would suggest that the estimates of the effect of teaching quality on earnings are not biased by the omission of motivation and may be under estimates of over the life time effect.
VII Conclusion
The role of private contribution in the funding of higher education in Europe is highly debated. The UK, which already charges the highest tuition fees, is considering altering the cap currently imposed on institutions. We show that even after accounting for selection, there is currently a wage premium to university quality ranging from 2% to 6%. This premium is non-linear, with high quality teaching providing substantial financial return (in some specification, there are returns also at the low end of the quality distribution) and relatively robust to changes of the population. Using NCDS evidence, we show that returns to teaching quality are not sensitive to the omission of academic motivation but may be increasing over the life time. IV results show that measurement error in quality can substantially bias the results downwards and suggest the measurement error is less of a problem when quality is measured at the institution rather than subject level. It thus seems that students and/or employers, depending on why returns to teaching quality are observed, have imperfect information on teaching quality apart from high and low values, and that the returns originates from institution overall quality at least as much as degree specific quality. Moreover, graduates were also asked whether with hindsight they would make the same investment decisions.
After controlling for current income as well as the other observable characteristics used throughout, teaching quality is significant only regarding the choice of institution, but not subject (Table 7) . This dataset is not suited in determining the origin of the returns to quality but this is clearly a question of interest to further research.
The estimates can be used to calculate the maximum fee differential that university could charge if they were able to capture fully the wage premium accruing from the quality effect. Depending on the assumptions made regarding the quality premium and its evolution over the life time, the fee differential ranges from £1,200 to £14,900. While the top estimates may appear large it is worth restating that these fee differentials would make student indifferent between attending a high teaching quality institution and an institution in the third quality quartile. In reality, universities are unlikely to be able to fully capture this rent, so charged fees would be substantially lower.
The current system of fixed price between all institutions can be thus considered unfair towards students attending the lower quality institutions as they pay the same price for a lower quality good which provide them lower returns. It may also lead to greater congestions as pupils may apply to institutions not commensurate with their ability level. According to the presented results only the top quality programmes would be able to charge substantially higher fees. Part of the generated income should be associated with more generous bursaries so as not to deter debtadverse students. A capping of fees may also lead to higher fees at some institutions than would be the case in a less regulated market, as the cap may be seen as a target and charging less a signal of low quality. However, lifting the cap could lead to an above inflation rise in tuition fees as has been observed in the US (Trends in College Pricing, 2007) , increasing disparity between higher education institutions quality and greater homogeneity of the student body within institution. Note: Wages are self-reported annual wages for full-time workers earning less than £60,000 three years after graduation. The regression line is based on a quadratic fit of subject quality on earnings. A Location controls are a set of 122 postcodes to account for local labour market characteristics. The other socio-economic characteristics are age, ethnicity, disability status, school type, whether expect to live at home when studying and tuition fee status. Specifications including quadratic and cubic terms in the quality score have also been specified but the higher polynomial orders were never significant. Note: The propensity scores are estimated by a probit with the following covariates: -propensity score 1: an indicator of A-level score missing, a cubic in A-level score, gender, parental occupation categories, tuition fees status, accommodation status, disability, type of school attended, ethnicity and a set of dummies for age on graduation, subject and grade on graduation.
-propensity score 2: an indicator of A-level score missing, a cubic in A-level score, gender, parental occupation categories, tuition fees status, accommodation status, disability, type of school attended, ethnicity and a set of dummies for age on graduation. The matching estimators is based on Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.01 a These statistics are based on a nearest neighbour matching with a caliper of 0.01 which are available upon request. Note: OLS estimates are based on specification (4) which excludes subject and grade, details of which are available in Table 2 . Propensity score matching is estimated for a set of controls which excludes subject and grade, details of which are found in Table 3 Continuous Treatment Matching is based on a continuous propensity score estimated for a set of controls which excludes subject and grade as explained in Figure 5 . Standard errors are based on bootstrapping with 500 replications. Note: OLS estimates based on the National Child Development Survey. The sample contains only individuals with valid wage information both at age 33 and 42. The full specification also includes dummies for gender, parental social class at age 11, part-time work and highest qualification at the time of survey, a quadratic in labour market experience and normalised test score in maths and reading at age 11. Table 2 specification 4 plus a quadratic function of current income.
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